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RNS Number : 7974G
Caledonian Trust PLC
31 March 2022
31 March 2022
Caledonian Trust plc
("Caledonian Trust", the "Company" or the "Group")
Unaudited interim results for the six months ended 31 December
2021
Caledonian Trust plc, the Edinburgh-based property investment
holding and development company, announces its unaudited interim
results for the six months ended 31 December 2021.
Enquiries:
Caledonian Trust plc
Douglas Lowe, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Tel: 0131 220 0416
Mike Baynham, Finance Director Tel: 0131 220 0416
Allenby Capital Limited
(Nominated Adviser and Broker)
Nick Athanas Tel: 0203 328 5656
Alex Brearley
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
Introduction
The Group made a pre-tax loss of GBP196,000 in the six months to
31 December 2021 compared with a pre-tax loss of GBP327,000 for the
same period last year. The loss per share for the six months to 31
December 2021 was 1.66p and the NAV per share as at 31 December
2021 was 206.7p compared with a loss per share of 2.77p and a NAV
per share of 201.7p last year. The Group's emphasis will continue
to be to secure, improve and realise the value in our property
portfolios.
Review of Activities
I provided a comprehensive review of activities in my December
statement accompanying our audited results for the year ended 30
June 2021.
The Group's property investment business continues, but the fit
out of the largest unit in our high yielding retail / industrial
property at Scotland Street, Glasgow, recently let to Deliveroo for
their first dark kitchen in Scotland, has been delayed pending the
installation of a new sub-station by Scottish Power Energy
Networks, which should proceed shortly. We continue to hold our
high yielding retail properties and North Castle Street offices,
four Edinburgh garages, a licensed restaurant in Alloa and our
residential site at Belford Road / Bell's Brae, Edinburgh.
St Margaret's House continues to be fully let at a nominal rent,
presently just over GBP1.50/ft(2) of occupied space, to a charity,
Edinburgh Palette, who have reconfigured and sub-let all the space
to over 200 artists, artisans and galleries. St Margaret's House
continues to maintain its high, long-term occupancy level which has
been largely unaffected by the impact of Covid-19.
We have appointed Montagu Evans to market St Margaret's House
and we plan to launch the marketing campaign next month. Already we
have extensive interest from a broad spectrum of parties in advance
of the formal market launch, including unsolicited offers.
At Brunstane the construction of the five new houses over
8,650ft(2) , in the Steading Courtyard, is progressing well with
the first house, which we will utilise as a show house, nearing
completion. We intend to commence marketing of all five houses as
soon as this house is complete and available for viewing.
Completion of the remaining four houses is expected in the
summer.
After a rather torturous planning application process we
obtained planning consent for 11 new houses over 20,500ft(2) in the
adjoining stackyard, "Upper Brunstane", at the end of January. We
are now preparing the requisite application to modify the consent
we hold for the conversion of an existing dilapidated stone
building, the farmhouse, to create two new houses over 3,100ft(2)
to fit in better with the adjoining developments.
At Wallyford we will go out to tender next month for the
construction of six detached houses and four semi-detached houses
over 13,500ft(2) and expect to commence construction this summer,
with a phased construction period over 15 months. The site lies
within 400m of the East Coast mainline station, is near the A1/A720
City Bypass junction and is contiguous with a completed development
of houses. Taylor Wimpey have completed the construction of over
500 houses nearby but on the other side of the mainline railway. On
the southern edge of Wallyford a very large development of around
2,000 houses has commenced at St Clements Wells on ground rising to
the south, affording extensive views over the Forth estuary to
Fife, and, on the eastern edge, Persimmon have completed a
development of 131 houses. On an adjacent site Taylor Wimpey have
completed 80 houses and have commenced work on their next site of
141 houses with four bedroom detached houses being marketed at
GBP273-GBP295/ft(2) . On the western side of St Clements Wells,
Barratts have sold all of the 245 three and four-bedroom houses in
Phase 1 and are currently building 106 three and four bedroom
houses in Phase 2 of the St Clements Wells site and 141 three and
four bedroom houses on the first phase of the adjoining site, St
Clements View. The Master Plan for the St Clements Wells
development includes a primary school and a separate nursery and
community facility, both of which opened in 2020, and a new
secondary school on an adjacent site which is under construction.
Planning consent in principle has been granted for another 600-800
new houses on the adjacent Dolphingstone site to the South-East.
Wallyford, no longer a mining village, is rapidly becoming another
leafy commuting Edinburgh suburb on the fertile East Lothian
coastal strip.
Economic Prospects
The UK's economic prospects now depend on the course of and the
effect of the two wars convulsing much of the western world: the
Russian military invasion of Ukraine, and the western economic
attack on Russia. Before these two separate shocks the UK economy
had recovered to the pre-Covid level, having grown 10.1% in the
twelve months ended 31 January 2022 and the National Institute of
Economic and Social Research (NIESR) forecasts growth of 1.3% in
Q1, 4.8% in 2022 and then in 2023 a return to the pre-Covid growth
rate of "well below" 2%. On such a forecast output would be around
4% lower in 2025 than was forecast in 2020 pre-Covid, resulting in
GBP5,500 of activity per person having been lost (compared to
forecast) over about two years! After this "one-off" loss of output
the future pattern of growth was expected to return to the
pre-Covid level. In contrast the growth pattern prior to the 2007
Great Recession and the ensuing financial crisis did not recover
and subsequent growth was at a lower level than before the Great
Recession. The growth forecasts were made, notwithstanding NIESR's
expected rise of inflation to 7% in the second quarter of 2022,
resulting in four interest rate rises, but with inflation falling
below 5% by 2023 and to the 2% target in 2024.
The possible economic consequences of the Russian invasion vary
widely. Fortunately, neither of these wars will cause a dramatic
change to the world economy or to the UK economy. Surprisingly,
regional wars, such as have occurred in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq,
Vietnam and Korea have not impacted seriously on remote or
noncombative economies, while the effect of localised wars such as
in Kuwait and Libya has been even more contained.
The economic damage to adjacent economies and to the world
economy depends on the progress of the Ukraine war whose progress
had several scenarios. Initially, the most likely scenario, with
the least damaging economic implications, was that there would be a
successful multi-pronged Panzer type blitzkrieg. Armoured columns
would advance rapidly over the plains - in Army parlance "good tank
country" - typical of much of Ukraine, one of the world's major
wheat producers, immediately after strikes had disabled Ukraine's
command and control centres and destroyed its aircraft and air
defence systems. Infrastructure, including roads and, particularly,
bridges would have been left intact to facilitate the weakly
opposed advance of the Russian armoured battle groups which would
quickly reach and occupy key cities, especially Kyiv. Following
such an occupation President Zelensky, if not detained, would flee
to Western Ukraine, or abroad and establish a government in exile.
A pro-Russian puppet regime would be set up in Kyiv. Then, Russia
would declare "liberation", withdraw its assault troops, leaving
garrisons but establishing extensive "security systems". Ukraine,
like Belarus, would become a client state of Russia, and while
there would be dire economic consequences for Ukraine, they would
be minimal elsewhere once any necessary supply adjustments have
been made.
Now a more likely scenario is of a "long war", the "blitzkrieg"
having failed as air supremacy is not obtained; Russian supply
lines are too outstretched; roads are obstructed by wreckage and
bridges blown; deep unsupported armoured penetration leaves flanks
exposed; and the quality of the Russian equipment, troops and
leadership is poor. In contrast, Ukraine's opposition is robust and
morale is reportedly high, and its troops are battle hardened from
the eastern conflict, have local support and are well supplied with
food, fuel and, at present, armaments, including, crucially, the
UK's NLAW and Javelin anti-armour missiles, Bayraktar TB2 drones
and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Unfortunately, however, while
Ukrainian resilience has exposed severe Russian qualitative
defects, such defects can be circumvented, as Stalin said,
"Quantity has a quality of its own". Russian "quantity" is
sufficient to suffer the losses required to bring the battle to its
key objectives, the cities, Kyiv in particular. If this occurs, and
consequently the resistance is concentrated in built-up and other
areas offering close cover and shelter from armoured vehicles, then
the outcome could be a long stalemate. Such a stalemate would be
broken only if, as seems likely, based on Russian strategy in Syria
and Chechnya, Russia employs military tactics to raze the cities or
thermobaric or even chemical weapons to annihilate the population.
If the cities were so destroyed the conflict would almost certainly
revert to widespread insurgency which, if supported internally and
externally, would permanently hold down much of the Russian army.
While little of the Ukraine terrain is favourable for an Afghan
type insurgency, the type and
quality of the available defensive weapons is more favourable as
are the re-supply routes on broad and varied boundaries. The
economic damage to Ukraine of a long war would be wider and persist
longer but there would be minimal additional damage to most
external economies.
Other scenarios, widening the scope of the conflict, would
result in greater economic damage, the extent varying widely. The
least serious economic damage would arise from an occupation of
other, but non-NATO, countries such as Moldova or Georgia, and the
most serious would be an attack on a NATO country such as
Lithuania, possibly to secure the Suwalki corridor to the Russian
enclave on the Baltic Sea and the port of Kaliningrad. Such attacks
could be construed as responses to the supply of arms to Ukraine or
in response to a "false flag" incident. Additionally, a
miscalculation and an escalation might follow a border incident,
leading to a wider war. Similarly, any involvement of NATO,
including a no-fly zone, could escalate into a wider war, but the
NATO countries appear steadfast in their resolve not to enter the
hostilities. The chaos, destruction and severe economic damage of a
wider war will, we all hope, be avoided.
A long war against insurgents, such as might present Russia in
Ukraine, has long established unfavourable precedents, including,
interestingly, the attempted Roman conquest of Scotland. Tacitus,
writing of his father-in-law's "set-piece" victory over the
Caledonii in AD83 near the Moray Firth, quotes the defeated
chieftain, Calgacus, "to ravage, to slaughter, to usurp under false
titles, they call empire; and where they make a desert, they call
it peace". A peace never endured as the distance, the culture and
the climate ensured that the Romans never overcame the subsequent
insurgency to command Scotland and thus Scotland never became part
of the Roman empire.
Much later analogies include Vietnam, and, in more similar
circumstances, the insurgency in Algeria between 1954 and 1962
which ground down the much superior French army and so sapped the
political will in France that the French withdrew. Similarly, an
occupation of Ukraine, apart from predominantly Russian areas,
would be faced with an effective, well-motivated and widely
supported armed insurgency. The starkest reminder of the likely
outcome of such an insurgency war is starkly evident in the
experiences in Afghanistan of the recent allied forces, the Russian
army before them and the British colonial forces all of whom, bowed
and bloodied, eventually left.
The likely consequences of losing such an insurgency war will
reinforce Putin's fear of the inauspicious precedent of the
downfall of a previous Russian autocrat, the final Russian Tsar,
Nicholas II. His defeat in the Japanese war in 1905 provided a
tripwire for the Bolshevik Revolution in which he lost not only his
crown but his life. The Tsar's tripwire may have been on a long
fuse, as was President Mugabe's of Zimbabwe and President Maduro's
of Venezuela, but detonation can be immediate as it was with
Presidents Mubarak of Egypt and Zine el-Abidine of Tunisia in 2011.
A long insurgency war would be a significant risk for a personality
cult leader like Putin, already weakened by the absolute failure of
the Blitzkrieg in Ukraine and the conduct of the war, including its
very heavy casualties. Professor Friedman of Kings College suggests
Putin may already have "tripped" the wire: "It is now as likely
that there will be regime change in Moscow as in Kyiv", but there
may be a long fuse. The most damaging option would be for Putin to
conclude like Lady Macbeth: "I am in blood / Stepped in so far,
that, should I wade no more, / Returning were as tedious as go
o'er".
Alternatively, as a long war morphing into a continuing bloody
insurgency would result in a "hurting stalemate". Putin, until now
a consummate strategist, may judge that the lesser of two evils
would be to build a "bridge out": a political settlement, and seek
an agreement disliked by both sides, but better than the
alternative. Such an agreement would encompass: no NATO
participation; ceding Crimea; ceding parts of the Donbas;
withdrawal of Russian troops; Ukrainian independence; and rights to
join the EU, or at least continue economic ties with Western
Europe!
I consider a diplomatic solution as the most likely outcome of
the military war, but, if the military war continues to be
restricted geographically, it is likely there would be minimal
effects on the non-combatants and the world economies. However, an
important, and more enduring, effect on the UK economy would be the
second ongoing war, the economic war against Russia.
The military war has caused an antithetical view of the value of
the relationship with Russia. Previously, while certain moral and
political differences were deplored, it was considered that in the
long-term co-operation, consideration and concession would align
such differences to mutual advantage: Putin was fêted; the
oligarchs were welcomed; and new trade deals on which our economies
now depend were agreed. Subsequently, many aspects of Russian
intentions and behaviour, precisely the same, while previously
interpreted as one "image", became instantly interpreted as a
contrary "image". A key example of such an illusion is the
ambiguous image presented equally as of an old lady or of a young
woman, a situation described as "perceptual rivalry" in which,
while the whole image is exposed to vision, key aspects only of the
image reaching the brain are accepted and used by the brain to
interpret a whole: in evolutionary terms, a wonderfully adaptive
rapid response mechanism - a few stripes are instantly interpreted
as a predatory tiger! However, the same image when different key
aspects are accepted by the brain is interpreted as a different
whole: the young woman is replaced by an old woman. The Russian
"image" has undergone such a comparable switch from benign
companion to malign witch: a realisation encapsulated in the
vernacular: "we was conned", or, as more tactfully put by the FT,
our vision has changed from "A dictatorship of spin to one of
fear".
The benign companion "came out" in 1989, the debut marked by the
fall of the Berlin Wall. The demolition of this totem of
isolationism resulted from the policies introduced by Mikhail
Gorbachev in response to the increasingly growing and obvious
difference in performance of the Western and Soviet economies,
highlighted by
the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost "openness" and Perestroika "restructuring" were designed to galvanise the economy and transform society, changes marked by the introduction of the elected Congress of People's Deputies. The resulting economic reforms, wholly at variance with Russian culture and its existing institutions, led to a severe economic contraction, huge government deficits and rampant inflation, particularly in respect of food, which formed a high percentage of expenditure for a large proportion of the population. The consequent unrest in impoverished and other sections of society was reinforced by opposition from the Russian communist bureaucracy whose power had been sapped by newly elected Congress, fatally wounding the controlling Communist Party and undermining its power throughout all the Soviet Republics. Ukraine brought these discordant actions to a head by calling an independence referendum in 1991 in which the turnout was 84% and the vote in favour was over 90%, a majority varying from 54% in Crimea to 80% in Donetsk and other eastern regions and over 95% in Kyiv and western districts. The then US ambassador in Moscow, Robert Strauss, advised Washington - "the most revolutionary event of 1991 for Russia may not be the collapse of Communism, but the loss of something Russians of all political stripes think of as part of their own body politic, and near to the heart at that: Ukraine."
Starting with Glasnost, Western policy towards Russia became
more and more accommodative, even as Russian policy under Putin
reversed Gorbachev's policies, particularly latterly with Germany
where Angela Merkel, brought up in East Germany, was fluent in
Russian. Taubman, Gorbachev's biographer says:-
"Russian President Vladimir Putin has been a vocal critic. When
Putin says that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest
geo-political catastrophe of the 20(th) century, he is indicting
Gorbachev as the man he blames for that collapse," Taubman says,
"Everything that Gorbachev did, Putin is in effect reversing".
Of the western powers, Germany continued to view Russia
particularly favourably, a policy of which the UK Ambassador, Sir
Paul Lever, said:-
"The German attitude is that trade is the key to harmonious
relations and should not be threatened, no matter how vilely China
or Russia behaves towards its own people. It is a genuine
principle, but also, of course, self-serving."
Such a view is succinctly put in the German catchphrase "Wandel
durch Handel" - change through trade.
The war in Ukraine has focused attention on the perception of
Russia's image where the benign has been replaced by the malign.
Symptomatic of such a reversal is the standing of Russian oligarchs
who, until now, were honoured, fêted and, at times, revered
throughout UK society, but who are now outcast. The sanctions
imposed on these individuals are among, although a small part of,
the vast range of economic sanctions agreed by the Western
economies, with worldwide support, at short notice. The oligarchs'
sanctions have the benefit of being "high profile", politically
advantageous and relatively costless, but their efficacy is
doubtful. The cost to the oligarchs may be high, but for the
majority will represent only a tolerable portion of their wealth.
More importantly, what political influence do they carry?
Certainly, they do not control the political parties, the security
services or the armed forces - indeed they have fled the more
austere "Mother Russia" for the "hedonist" West. Possessions for
Putin rank lower than politics, power and posterity. Such
sanctions may prove no more than expensive irritations.
But will such economic warfare "work" or are these, like the
sanctions on oligarchs, more a kneejerk reaction. The key questions
are: what effect will they have on the Russian economy; what
influence will that have on Russian policy; what will the cost be
to the Western economies, the UK's economy in particular; and are
they worth it? That there has been an immediate effect on the
Russian economy is evident by the rise in interest rates to 20%,
the 25% devaluation of the rouble and the immediate shortage of
goods. However, the extensive withdrawal of Western companies has
aspects of "tokenism" as often replacements, of at least some sort,
seem to become available: surely the meat sources for "McDonalds"
are still available! The effect of the inhibition on international
banking access and the extensive denial of certain financial
services is uncertain, as traders often create substitutive
arrangements and facilities may open with China or others. Oil and
commodity sanctions seem most damaging but, patently, the cost to
the sanctioners would be very high (German gas!) but, as most
commodities are traded worldwide, piped gas largely excluded, often
only the customer would change. However, the sanctions will have an
important economic effect and, consequent to the sanctions
announced by 9 March 2022, Capital Economics forecast an 8% fall in
Russian GDP followed by economic stagnation.
The influence of sanctions on Russian policy, whatever their
extent, is uncertain. First, sanctions generally have been poor
weapons with results, if and when achieved, taking a long time.
Second, in the specific conditions in Russia sanctions might be
counterproductive as the centrally controlled media might credibly
portray the West as being responsible for any resulting suffering,
particularly, as for many, there continues to be an unswerving
loyalty to the incumbent "Tsar". In addition, there is a culture in
times of crisis of "suffering" for "Mother Russia", a reaction
which might imitate a London "blitz" type spirit. There will be
opposition, there will be local objections and some general unrest,
but it seems likely that only a long and / or deep period of
economic stress would have significant political influence.
In the UK's case the answers seem clearer. The economic war will
be expensive for the UK economy and the expense, while varying with
the length of that war, is likely to leave a long deleterious
trail. The costs of the economic war are difficult to disentangle
from the costs of the invasive war, but analysts, quoted in the
Financial Times, recognise them, if only in general terms:-
"The longer the war lasts and the greater the sanctions on
Russia are, the greater the hit to UK activity".
While the cost of sanctions is presently obscure, it is
self-evident that some sanctions have a great impact at little cost
while others have little impact but at great cost: the former
should be maximised and the latter minimised.
The wars will increase the inflation inherent in the recovery of
the economy and which, as measured by the financial markets, is
expected to average more than 5% over the next five years and,
whereas the Bank in February expected inflation to peak at 7% in
April, Goldman Sachs now expects 9.5% in October 2022 and over 7%
until Spring 2023. Overall, the cost of the invasive war is
estimated to be moderate with the UK 2022 growth forecast reduced
by 0.8% points to 4.0%. The effects of the war on other economies
varies with geographical and trade separation and, thus, while US
growth is only forecast to be 0.1% lower, the EU's growth,
including Germany, most closely tied to Russia, is forecast to be
1.0% lower! I regard these forecasts likely to be tempered by
optimism bias, as at the commencement of the World War I - "the war
will be over by Christmas"!
Before the war, the Bank of England had forecast the largest
squeeze on living standards in 30 years to occur in 2022, primarily
as a result of inflation, particularly of fuel costs, both directly
and indirectly throughout the economy, a squeeze which will be
greatly exacerbated by the further increase expected on both fuel
and food prices caused by the military and economic wars. Such
increases will reduce discretionary consumer spending, a key
element of forecast GDP growth, such that the British Chamber of
Commerce reduced its forecast of consumer spending growth in 2022
from 6.9% to 4.4%.
Business investment will be reduced due to higher interest rates
and the current high risk of unfavourable market conditions, and
these inhibitions will similarly affect consumer capital
expenditure, particularly for houses. These external influences
weigh particularly heavily on the UK as it lacks the "normal" level
of compensatory internal offset of increased growth engendered by
higher productivity. There is no single identifiable cause for the
UK's slow growth in productivity but the rigidity of the UK's
economic structures, the unnecessary regulation, the extensive
range of organisations profiting from distributive coalitions,
oligopolies, including some professions, and the continuing policy
errors of politicians, and Government agencies all contribute
adversely to it. In such adversity, Scotland should enjoy an
unexpected economic benefit from the resurgence of the oil and gas
industry - a sensible reversal as the source of the energy consumed
is unrelated to "green" aspirations.
I conclude that within a very wide spectrum of possible outcomes
the "wars" and their likely outcomes will reduce UK economic growth
by less than two percentage points: a good forecast in difficult
circumstances, but one subject to an unusually high degree of
error.
Property Prospects
I reviewed property prospects comprehensively in my statement to
30 June 2021 based on forecasts made in the autumn. By December
2021 the forecast returns for 2021 had improved very considerably
over the forecasts made only three months earlier. The Investment
Property Forum (IPF) All Property return for 2021, previously
forecast at 6.9%, is now estimated at 11.0%, due primarily to an
outstanding estimate of a 24.5% return for Industrials compared to
the earlier forecast of 16.4% - itself an outstanding return - and
of 15.8% for Retail Warehouses as opposed to "only" 8.4% with
improved estimates in all other sectors, including Standard Retail
and Shopping Centres where the "negative" returns were reduced.
Since then, the rapid economic recovery has continued and GDP had
recovered to the pre-pandemic 2020 level in late 2021 and has grown
a further 1.1% in the months to February 2022.
The continued improvement is reflected in improved IPF forecast
returns for 2022 compared to previous estimates. The All Property
return for 2022 is now forecast at 8.6% compared to 7.4% earlier,
primarily due to an upward revisal of Industrial returns to 12.3%,
a significant forecast return for 2022, but small compared to the
estimated 2021 returns of over 20%, together with small upward
revisals to Office returns, but with little overall change of
forecast in the Retail sector where Retail Warehouse returns were
forecast to improve, but Standard Retail and Shopping Centre
returns were forecast to fall slightly.
Forecasts for 2023 and subsequent years are very little changed
and show All Property returns averaging 6.0%, but for Industrials
and Retail Warehouses are higher at 7.0% and lower for Standard
Retail and Shopping Centres at 4.5%. The limited net return on
these retail sectors reflects a persistent small decline in capital
value.
The IPF forecasts are based on the mean of 20 forecasts whose
individual forecasts are widely dispersed. Colliers provides
comprehensive forecasts which, interestingly, as there is no
averaging, are very similar to the IPF means. Colliers also provide
wide ranging reports, some of exceptional interest. For example,
they report that in 2021 the All Property return was 16.5%, a six
year high, due primarily to an Industrial return of 36.4% and a
Retail Warehouse return of 21.9%. The exceptional returns from
Industrials result from the demand for storage and distribution
centres for "online" shopping, accounting for 29.1% of all
retailing in 2021, up from 19.2% in 2019 before the Covid
pandemic.
The mirror image of a rise in online sales has been a fall in
offline sales indirectly responsible for the significant fall in
retail values. The retail sales fall was exacerbated by "lockdown",
tourist restrictions and Work from Home ("WFH"), all of which
restrictions are now easing, although WFH seems likely to continue
but at a much lower frequency. Almost all the above restrictions to
Retail sales will be lifted shortly.
Colliers suggest that online sales outlets may increasingly
switch to offline collections, including presumably, some retail
locations, due to increased costs. They cite higher labour costs,
HGV driver shortage and rising fuel costs as likely to increase
delivery charges and make online prices less competitive, giving an
incentive to switch online deliveries to retail type locations. I
observed in December that some online sales may be loss leaders as
return rates on many fashion items (75% is reported anecdotally)
are so high that return, repackaging and wastage costs may make
some sales uneconomic. Online sales and retail premises will
benefit from any resulting changes.
The rate of decline in the number of retail traders has greatly
reduced and the uptake of retail premises, especially for goods and
services that cannot be delivered or delivered easily online, has
greatly increased. In 2021 retail openings rose 10.5% to 43,167
while closures rose 1.4% to 51,069, a net loss of 7,902 units
compared to 11,319 in 2020.
The type of shops opening and closing are not representative of
the previously existing stock as a change is taking place in the
type and ownership of shops. In 2021 10,059 net multiples closed
and 2,157 net independents opened. The main sectors expanding (net)
are in personal services: Barbers 545; Fast Food 508; Beauty 266;
Nail 149; and "convenience": cafes, tearooms, bars, ice cream
parlours, pizzerias and restaurants. The main sectors closing (net)
are primarily now increasingly trading "online": Banks 734, Bookies
403, Estate Agents 293, Travel Agents 374 and Recruitment Agents
289; and secondarily comparison shops such as fashion; charity
clothes - women; and, separately, public houses and inns.
The trend to fewer closures seems likely to continue - how many
banks and similar premises remain to be closed?; - while the demand
for convenience openings should grow with income, demographic
change and habit, such habits extending both down and up the age
groups; and the return to more office working and to more extensive
leisure activity. Two other factors reinforce the likely retail
premises recovery: rent reductions of around 20% have occurred
reducing retailers' costs and rates and other concessions seem
possible, if not even likely, and there is a growing ambition,
shared by private owners and local authorities, to revitalise, to
redecorate and to repurpose the high street. Local Data Company
forecast a "burgeoning recovery" with significant growth in
Leisure, Food and Beverage; stabilised rents on traditional leases;
and increased involvement in the community by retailers and
increased support for such retailers by the community, so
modernising and revitalising the high street and increasing demand.
Thus, the retail market will turn but such a turn, unlike the
yacht's rapid gybe of the industrial market, will be the tanker's
slow turn.
The anomalously high rise in house prices that I reported in
December 2021 has continued. In the year to February 2022 rises
were reported by the Halifax as 10.8%; Nationwide 12.6%; Acadata
(E&W) 6.9%; and Acadata (Scotland) 7.6%. In the most recent
three months this 12-month high rate has continued and the Halifax
index increased by an annualised three-month rate of 7.2% and the
Nationwide by an unexplained and very high 14.4%. The Halifax and
Nationwide prices as "standardised" are seasonally adjusted - in
this case upwards, because actual prices normally fall in the
winter - and their indices are not comparable with the Acadata
indices which are not seasonally adjusted. The Acadata E&W
three-month price rise annualised (and not seasonally adjusted up!)
was an astonishing 18.4% but in Scotland a more reasonable
6.0%.
In its February 2022 report the Halifax comments: "house prices
rise at fastest annual pace since 2007 to reach record high...".
"The biggest one-year cash rise in over 39 years of the index
history". The index rose 10.8% with the highest rises of 13% in
outlying areas: Wales, SW England and Northern Ireland and with the
lowest rise of 5.0% in London. The Halifax states "these areas
benefit from more rural scenic living". In Scotland prices rose 9%,
the lowest rise apart from London. The Nationwide also reports
record price rises: "the largest ever annual increase in cash terms
since the start of our monthly index in 1991" due to "robust demand
and limited stock of homes on the market".
The Acadata (E&W) survey highlights a real movement from
"rural living" back to "Greater London and the South East [in the]
top four areas of growth". This is emphasised by the price rise in
Runnymede (Magna Carta!) on the Thames with an annual rise of 50.4%
in detached houses (but -14.1% in flats!) and 35.2% overall. The
Acadata Scotland survey says the average price "sets a new record
level for the eighth time in the last 12 months". The survey
highlights the "race for space" due to the "effects of the pandemic
and lifestyle changes" and comments that "the Lothians [were] the
top three in terms of price growth..." [giving] homes with plenty
of space outside Edinburgh City Centre, but within commuting
distance of the capital" .... Perhaps a "Scottymede" on the Forth?
at a fraction of the price!
Comprehensive forecasts for house prices are given by Savills,
but, as the latest forecasts were published in November 2021, they
do not reflect the current circumstances prospectively so changed
since then and say "we await to see how the market and the broader
economy react to the Omicron variant".
Industry comments on price changes are guarded: Lloyds Bank
consider growth will be "flatter" at 1%, due to interest rate rises
and "further financial strains in households", and Rightmove
consider the "asking price... will rise next year by 5% which will
mean an increase of about GBP17,000". RICS "predicts that house
prices could end up 3-5% higher in 2022 as higher borrowing costs
will dampen demand..." offset by "inventory back close to historic
lows". Separately, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)
"expect demand to ease over the next year due to a fall in real
incomes and a rise in interest rates, causing house prices to slow
to around 1% by late 2023".
Comments on future average house price rises often consider the
effects of the ending of the Covid pandemic on the distribution of
house price changes as a result of a change back - i.e. from "rural
living to city dwelling", a trend Acadata reports is already
occurring in England's SE market.
The main immediate determinant of house prices will be the
changes underway in the economy. Such changes arise first from the
unprecedented return of demand as the economy, recovering from the
restrictions imposed to obviate the health catastrophe, encounters
supply shortages primarily caused by the short-term inelasticity of
supply. The recent inflation is due to short-term supply shortages
rather than excess demand. Unfortunately, such price rises, large
in themselves, will be eclipsed by the even more significant rises
already being caused by the war in Ukraine - see for instance the
over 100% rise in wheat prices - and these price rises which will
extend the longer the conflicts continue.
While the economy at present is growing strongly, growth will
depend on the impact of the projected inflationary rises. As the
inflation is not caused primarily by excess demand or 1970s type
labour cost rises, raising interest rates other than to preserve
the image and culture of inflation control to avoid a cultural
acceptance of inflation is disadvantageous: monetary policy should
be maintained "loose" as is allowed in the Bank's mandate under
such exceptional conditions. Similarly, fiscal policy should also
be kept loose to offset some of the price effect on demand. The
economic failure of fiscal policy following the 2007 Great
Recession should not be repeated: that mistaken austerity programme
proved a disaster.
Thus, I forecast that both monetary and fiscal policy will be
accommodative to at least some extent and that interest rates will
not rise above 3%. However, even such a level, low by historical
standards will have a significant influence on demand for houses in
two respects. Mortgage costs will reduce demand which will be
further artificially restricted by The Mortgage Market Review rules
governing the borrowing capacity.
I conclude that the current house price boom will not continue.
I forecast that over the short-term prices will fall in real terms
but in money terms will, on average at least, be stable until the
current crisis passes. However, in the long term the major
determinant of prices will be supply, primarily land supply. The
land supply is determined by centrally set rules and regulations
based on social and political objectives, interpreted locally,
which invariably restricts the supply of land, raising its price.
These supply restrictions are deeply entrenched and closely guarded
with considerable political influence and thus, without
equivocation, I repeat my forecast: "the key determinant of the
long-term housing market will be a shortage of supply, resulting in
higher prices".
Conclusion
Two years ago I concluded:
"I believe that the measures to reduce the spread of Covid-19
will inflict an unprecedented shock to the economy, possibly
resulting in an unprecedented 20% short term economic
contraction.
Evidence from countries subject to similar measures shows that
the measures now being adopted, primarily "lock down" (as in
medieval Italy), bring a rapid stabilisation in the numbers of new
infections within 4 - 6 weeks. Thereafter stricter quarantine
measures, extensive testing - equipment will become available for
this - higher NHS capacity, potentially the effect of higher
daytime temperatures and UV levels, better personal hygiene and the
use of existing or the discovery of new drugs and vaccines should
allow the rates of infection and mortality rate to fall. All the
time the proportion of the population immune to the disease will
rise, reducing the propagation rate of the disease for any given
circumstances. Like "true" influenza, it will become a continuing
endemic disease, but one no longer influencing the economy.
The release of or a qualified use of "lockdown" will provide an
immediate upsurge in the UK economy, but it is unlikely to recover
immediately more than 80% of the "lost" ground. It is the estimate
of rate of recovery of the balance of GDP that is subject to a very
wide margin of error. The delay to the return to the present level
of GDP will be determined by the damage to the supply side of the
economy by the current pre-emptive slow down. Recessions normally
impair the demand side of the economy - squeezing inflation, making
credit expensive and sometimes unobtainable even for the
creditworthy. The current and proposed government measures seem
likely to support demand. My current forecast for a full recovery
in GDP is within two years". The 2020 forecast has proved
apposite.
Last year I forecast the long-term cost to the economy to be
equivalent to about two years of normal 1.5% growth, say 3%, and
that this gap would not be made-up or closed by increased output
above the normal 1.5% p.a. It would be a permanent "scar" due to
damage to the supply side of the economy, in contrast to "normal"
recessions induced by measures that bear primarily on the demand
side of the economy. The current NIESR estimate is for a long-term
loss of about 4% to the economy as the economy, prior to the
Ukraine war, was expected, having completed its recovery in 2022,
to return to the pre-Covid rate of growth of "well below 2.0%".
This is an economic analysis: I hold as implicit moral
repugnance, indignation and outrage. I note with horror the
similarity of Putin's to Adolf Hitler's rise and progressive
autocratic control, a process noted by Robert Kagan "as often has
been the case in other countries where fascist leaders arise, their
would-be opponents are paralysed in confusion and amazement at this
charismatic authoritarian leader".
The war in Ukraine has pre-empted all previous economic
forecasts, the chief variables being the length of the wars and the
extent of the adverse effect of the economic war, currently greatly
underestimated, and the measures taken to counter these adverse
variables. Suitable UK accommodative monetary and fiscal measures
could ameliorate their effects considerably.
The Ukraine war is the latest in a series of deleterious
influences on the UK economy, or paraphrasing Alan Bennett's The
History Boys, "Economics is just one damned thing after another".
Certainly, this is the latest in a series starting with the 2007
Great Recession, the 2014 Independence Referendum, the 2016 Brexit
decision and the 2020 Covid pandemic. More importantly, cumulative
incurred losses have not been recovered subsequently by increased
productivity, which has not reverted to the level obtained prior to
2007 of about 2.25%. Since 2015/16 productivity has increased 4.9%
over six years or 0.8%pa.
Productivity has been about 1.5 percentage points below the
2007/8 level which, had it been maintained at that level, would
have resulted in output now being around 25% higher than current
estimates. In its analysis the NIESR concludes:-
"The UK has one of the poorest productivity performances among
the OECD's 38 advanced economies and this has been made worse by
Covid-19. If policymakers return to the same economic structures
post-pandemic that failed to resolve the productivity problem
pre-pandemic, then the UK is set for another decade of a
low-growth, low-productivity and low-wage economy".
Of this Mark Wolf says "The biggest problem for the UK remains
its dismal underlying productivity growth". This is dramatically
illustrated by the NIESR's recent analysis of Public Sector
productivity - where it says: "inputs rising by 19% since 2019 and
output by only about half that", or a reduction of 8%.
Covid-19 and the lockdown measures have adversely affected the
Group, directly and indirectly. Our property investment business
has only suffered mildly as the smaller businesses tenanting our
properties have proved resilient and have not been so affected by
the inroads made by online ordering. The principal adverse effect
on the Group has been the grave uncertainty that teaching formats
and travel has had, until very recently, on University entrance
rolls and rental collection from student accommodation. Such
uncertainty had caused the widespread postponement of securing
further student accommodation and has resulted in delays to the
sale of St. Margaret's House. However, recent market information is
that university UCAS clearing applications are at record numbers
and that demand for purpose-built accommodation for students
continues to increase.
Market conditions improved in late 2021 and an extensive
pre-sale preparation programme for St. Margaret's House was nearly
complete in December, but given new Covid restrictions and the
effect of the imminent holiday season the proposed marketing was
delayed then until February 2022 when, acting on Agents advice on
the type of enquiries being informally received, we determined to
improve and simplify the pre-sale conditions in order to obviate or
at least reduce the likelihood of a "false finish" as had occurred
previously.
The very successful prices achieved at Brunstane and the
strength of the housing market, especially for large family homes
which, as a result of the pandemic, has spread out to wider
commuting areas and is enabling us to extend our development
programme.
The first house in the Steading phase of the Brunstane
development is expected to be available for viewing in April and
marketing of the five houses will commence then with prices
expected to be over GBP370/ft(2) . Planning consent for the next 11
houses in Upper Brunstane has recently been gained and we are
endeavouring to bring this development forward to follow the
Steading development.
The 10-house site at Wallyford has been redesigned and a site
start is expected in the summer. Further work has been commenced on
the 20 flat site at Belford Road, Edinburgh where discussions
continue on a planning variation which would improve its design and
amenity and meet enhanced modern market requirements. Work is also
taking place on other sites to allow a sequential development
programme.
For some years I have concluded:
"In our existing portfolio, most development properties are
valued at cost, usually based on existing use, and when these sites
are developed or sold, I expect their considerable upside will be
realised. Some investment properties also have considerable
development value, as we expect to realise at St Margaret's." I am
confident that these expectations are now being realised.
I D LOWE
Chairman
31 March 2022
Caledonian Trust PLC
Registered Number 01040126
Consolidated income statement for the six months ended 31
December 2021
__________________________________________________________________________________
Note 6 months 6 months Year
ended ended ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 Jun
2021 2020 2021
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Revenue
Revenue from development property
sales - 947 4,186
Gross rental income from investment
properties 167 193 368
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Total Revenue 167 1,140 4,554
Cost of development property
sales - (787) (3,930)
Impairment adjustment on development - (165) -
property
Property charges (47) (56) (128)
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Cost of Sales (47) (1,008) (4,058)
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Gross Profit 120 132 496
Administrative expenses (254) (233) (440)
Other income - 6 2
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Net operating (loss)/profit
before investment property
disposals and valuation movements
(134) (95) 58
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Valuation gains on investment
properties 5 - - 690
Valuation losses on investment
properties
Loss on sale on sale of investment - (165) -
property 5 - - (151)
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Net (losses)/gains on investment
properties - (165) 539
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Operating (loss)/profit (134) (260) 597
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Financial expenses (62) (67) (137)
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
Net financing costs (62) (67) (137)
---------------- ---------------- --------------------
(Loss)/profit before taxation (196) (327) 460
Income tax 6 - - -
(Loss)/profit and total comprehensive
income
for the financial period attributable
to equity
holders of the parent Company (196) (327) 460
(Loss)/profit per share
Basic and diluted (loss)/profit
per share (pence) 7 (1.66p) (2.77p) 3.90p
Caledonian Trust PLC
Registered Number 01040126
Consolidated statement of changes in equity as at 31 December
2021
__________________________________________________________________________________
Share Capital Share Retained Total
Capital redemption premium earnings
reserve account
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
At 1 July 2021 2,357 175 2,745 19,278 24,555
Loss and total
comprehensive expenditure
for the period - - - (196) (196)
At 31 December 2021 2,357 175 2,745 19,082 24,359
At 1 July 2020 2,357 175 2,745 18,818 24,095
Loss and total
comprehensive expenditure
for the period - - - (327) (327)
At 31 December 2020 2,357 175 2,745 18,491 23,768
At 1 July 2020 2,357 175 2,745 18,818 24,095
Profit and total
comprehensive income
for the period - - - 460 460
At 30 June 2021 2,357 175 2,745 19,278 24,555
Caledonian Trust PLC
Registered Number 01040126
Consolidated balance sheet as at 31 December 2021
__________________________________________________________________________________
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 Jun
2021 2020 2021
Note GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Non-current assets
Investment property 8 17,110 17,555 17,110
Plant and equipment 11 10 3
Investments 1 1 1
Total non-current assets 17,122 17,566 17,114
Current assets
Trading properties 9,896 12,146 9,313
Trade and other receivables 121 150 135
Cash and cash equivalents 2,322 62 3,020
Total current assets 12,339 12,358 12,468
Total assets 29,461 29,924 29,582
Current liabilities
Trade and other payables (722) (1,206) (647)
Interest bearing loans and
borrowings (360) (830) (360)
Total current liabilities (1,082) (2,036) (1,007)
Non-current liabilities
Interest bearing loans and
borrowing (4,020) (4,120) (4,020)
Total liabilities (5,102) (6,156) (5,027)
Net assets 24,359 23,768 24,555
Equity
Issued share capital 10 2,357 2,357 2,357
Capital redemption reserve 175 175 175
Share premium account 2,745 2,745 2,745
Retained earnings 19,082 18,491 19,278
----------------- ----------------- --------------
Total equity attributable
to equity
holders of the parent Company 24,359 23,768 24,555
NET ASSET VALUE PER SHARE 206.7p 201.7p 208.4p
Caledonian Trust PLC
Registered Number 01040126
Consolidated cash flow statement for the six months ended 31
December 2021
__________________________________________________________________________________
6 months 6 months Year
ended ended ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 Jun
2021 2020 2021
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Cash flows from operating
activities
(Loss)/profit for the period (196) (327) 460
Adjustments for:
Net loss on sale of investment
property - - 151
Net loss/(gain) on revaluation
of investment properties - 165 (690)
Impairment adjustment on development - 165 -
property
Depreciation and Loss on sale
of fixed assets - - 2
Net finance expense 62 67 137
Operating cash flows before
movements (134) 70 60
in working capital
(Increase)/decrease in trading
properties (583) 695 3,693
Decrease/(increase) in trade
and other receivables 14 (28) (13)
Increase/(decrease) in trade
and other payables 73 (74) (370)
Cash (absorbed by)/generated
from operations (630) 663 3,370
Interest paid (60) - (333)
Net cash (outflow)/inflow
from operating activities (690) 663 3,037
Investment activities
Proceeds from sale of investment
properties - - 1,149
Proceeds from sale of fixed
assets - - 5
Acquisition of plant and equipment (8) - -
Cash flows (absorbed by) investing
activities (8) - 1,154
(Decrease) in borrowings - (673) (1,243)
Cash flows (absorbed by) financing
activities - (673) (1,243)
Net (decrease)/increase in
cash and cash equivalents (698) (10) 2,948
Cash and cash equivalents
at beginning of period 3,020 72 72
Cash and cash equivalents
at end of period 2,322 62 3,020
================= =================== ==============
Caledonian Trust PLC
Registered Number 01040126
Notes to the interim statement
1 This interim statement for the six-month period to 31 December
2021 is unaudited and was approved by the directors on 31 March
2022. Caledonian Trust PLC (the "Company") is a company
incorporated in England and domiciled in the United Kingdom. The
information set out does not constitute statutory accounts within
the meaning of Section 434 of the Companies Act 2006.
2 Going concern basis
The Group and parent Company finance their day to day working
capital requirements through related party loans and bank and other
funding for specific development projects. The directors have
assessed the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on its cash flow
forecasts and expect that current rental streams and property sales
in the normal course of business will provide sufficient cash
inflows to allow the Group to continue to trade.
The related party lender, Leafrealm Limited, a company
controlled by Douglas Lowe, Caledonian Trust's Chairman, Chief
Executive and major shareholder, has indicated its willingness to
continue to provide financial support and not to demand repayment
of its principal loan during 2022. Accordingly, the directors
continue to adopt the going concern basis in preparing this interim
statement.
3 Basis of preparation
The consolidated interim financial statements of the Company for
the six months ended 31 December 2021 are in respect of the Company
and its subsidiaries, together referred to as the "Group". The
financial information set out in this announcement for the year
ended 30 June 2021 does not constitute the Group's statutory
accounts for that period within the meaning of Section 434 of the
Companies Act 2006. Statutory accounts for the year ended 30 June
2021 are available on the Company's website at
www.caledoniantrust.com and have been delivered to the Registrar of
Companies. The accounts for the year ended 30 June 2021 have been
prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting
Standards ("IFRS") in conformity with the requirements of the
Companies Act 2006. The auditors have reported on those financial
statements; their reports were (i) unqualified, (ii) did not
include references to any matters to which the auditors drew
attention by way of emphasis without qualifying their reports, and
(iii) did not contain statements under Section 498 (2) or (3) of
the Companies Act 2006.
The financial information set out in this announcement has been
prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standard IAS34
"Interim Financial Reporting". The financial information is
presented in sterling and rounded to the nearest thousand.
The interim financial statements have been prepared based on
IFRS that are expected to exist at the date on which the Group
prepares its financial statements for the year ending 30 June 2022.
To the extent that IFRS at 30 June 2022 do not reflect the
assumptions made in preparing the interim statements, those
financial statements may be subject to change.
In the process of applying the Group's accounting policies,
management necessarily makes judgements and estimates that have a
significant effect on the amounts recognised in the interim
statement. Changes in the assumptions underlying the estimates
could result in a significant impact to the financial information.
The most critical of these accounting judgement and estimation
areas are included in the Group's 2021 consolidated financial
statements and the main areas of judgement and estimation are
similar to those disclosed in the financial statements for the year
ended 30 June 2021.
4 Accounting policies
The accounting policies used in preparing these financial
statements are the same as those set out and used in preparing the
Group's audited financial statements for the year ended 30 June
2021 .
5 Valuation (losses)/gains on investment properties
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 Jun
2021 2020 2021
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Valuation gains in investment
properties - - 690
Valuation losses on investment
properties after transaction - (165) -
costs
Net valuation (losses)/gains
on investment properties - (165) 690
6 Income tax
Taxation for the six months ended 31 December 2021 is based on
the effective rate of taxation which is estimated to apply to the
year ending 30 June 2022. Due to the tax losses incurred there is
no tax charge for the period.
In the case of deferred tax in relation to investment property
revaluation surpluses, the base cost used is historical book cost
and includes allowances or deductions which may be available to
reduce the actual tax liability which would crystallise in the
event of a disposal of the asset. At 31 December 2021 there is a
deferred tax asset which is not recognised in these accounts.
7 Profit or loss per share
Basic profit or loss per share is calculated by dividing the
profit or loss attributable to ordinary
shareholders by the weighted average number of ordinary shares
outstanding during the period as follows:
6 months 6 months Year
ended ended ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 Jun
2021 2020 2021
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
(Loss)/profit for financial
period (196) (327) 460
No. No. No.
Weighted average no. of
shares:
For basic and diluted profit
or
loss per share 11,783,577 11,783,577 11,783,577
Basic (loss)/profit per
share (1.66p) (2.77p) 3.90p
Diluted (loss)/profit per
share (1.66p) (2.77p) 3.90p
8 Investment Properties
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 Jun
2021 2020 2021
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Valuation
Opening valuation 17,110 17,720 17,720
Disposed in period - - (1,300)
Revaluation in period - (165) 690
Closing valuation 17,110 17,555 17,110
The fair value of investment property at 31 December 2021 was
determined by the directors taking cognisance of the independent
valuation by Montagu Evans, Chartered Surveyors as at 30 June 2019
having made adjustments for changes in leases and market
conditions.
The valuations take into account the impact of Covid-19 which
has not had a significant effect on the value of the Group's
investment properties due to the nature of the properties and
demand being maintained for small commercial properties.
9 Financial instruments
Fair values
Fair values versus carrying amounts
The fair values of financial assets and liabilities, together
with the carrying amounts shown in the balance sheet, are as
follows:
31 Dec 2021 31 Dec 2020 30 Jun 2021
Fair Carrying Fair Carrying Fair Carrying
value amount value amount value amount
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000 GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Trade and other
receivables 86 86 81 81 108 108
Cash and cash
equivalents 2,322 2,322 62 62 3,020 3,020
2,408 2,408 143 143 3,128 3,128
-------- --------- ------- --------- ------- ---------
Loans from related
parties 4,380 4,380 4,595 4,595 4,380 4,380
Bank loan - - 355 355 - -
Trade and other
payables 722 722 1,201 1,201 639 639
5,102 5,102 6,151 6,151 5,019 5,019
======== ========= ======= ========= ======= =========
Estimation of fair values
The following methods and assumptions were used to estimate the
fair values shown above:
Trade and other receivables/payables - the fair value of
receivables and payables with a remaining life of less than one
year is deemed to be the same as the book value.
Cash and cash equivalents - the fair value is deemed to be the
same as the carrying amount due to the short maturity of these
instruments.
Other loans - the fair value is calculated by discounting the
expected future cashflows at prevailing interest rates.
10 Issued share capital
31 Dec 2021 31 Dec 2020 30 Jun 2021
No. No. No.
000 GBP000 000 GBP000 000 GBP000
Issued and
Fully paid
Ordinary shares
of 20p each 11,784 2,357 11,784 2,357 11,784 2,357
11 Seasonality
Investment property sales by the Group are not seasonal and
sales of completed houses on development sites are driven more by
completion of construction projects than by season.
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END
IR BBGDXDUXDGDB
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
March 31, 2022 08:56 ET (12:56 GMT)
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